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Medicare+Choice (M+C), the program that provides a managed-care option
to Medicare. This paper answers the following questions: How does the
equilibrium number of HMOs participating in county M+C markets vary
with the capitation payment they are offered? How large a payment is required
at the margin to ensure that various percentages of county markets have a
M+C HMO, or to ensure that various percentages of Medicare beneficiaries
have the choice of a M+C plan in their county of residence? The strategy for
identifying the effect of government payment on HMO participation relies on a
natural experiment; in 1997, Congress divorced M+C payments to HMOs from
changes in underlying costs. The results in this paper suggest that the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has consistently underestimated the
payment necessary to support HMOs in rural, sparsely populated areas. We
also find that it would require a large incremental payment to support HMOs
in M+C for the final 10% of counties or final 10% of Medicare beneficiaries.
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1. Introduction
Faced with rapidly rising Medicare costs, Congress in 1982 directed
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)1 to contract
with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to provide man-
aged care to Medicare beneficiaries. Under this program, now titled
Medicare+Choice (M+C)2, HMOs furnish all Medicare-covered ser-
vices in exchange for a per-capita prospective payment.3
This paper seeks to answer the following questions concerning the
M+C program. How does the equilibrium number of HMOs participat-
ing in county M+C markets vary with the CMS capitation payment they
are offered?4 How does the percent of counties with at least one M+C
HMO vary with the CMS payment rate? How large a CMS payment is
required to ensure that various percentages of Medicare beneficiaries
have the choice of a M+C plan in their county of residence?
Our strategy for identifying the effect of CMS payment on HMO
participation is to observe how the number of participating HMOs
varies over counties and time in response to changes in CMS payment
while controlling for estimated costs. Variation in payment comes from
a natural experiment; in 1997, Congress divorced M+C payments to
HMOs from changes in underlying costs.
The number of HMOs participating in M+C markets is important
for several reasons. In the HMO market there is considerable product
differentiation on many dimensions. The number of participating HMOs
is a measure of the extent of choice enjoyed by beneficiaries. The partic-
ipation of a single HMO in a M+C market offers Medicare beneficiaries
in that market an alternative to fee-for-service care. The participation of
several HMOs in a market results in greater competition for enrollment,
which has the salutary effect of increasing benefits and/or lowering
costs for managed care enrollees.5
1. In 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration was renamed the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). For the sake of consistency, the agency is referred
to as CMS throughout this paper.
2. The program we study has had several names during its history. It was not titled
Medicare+Choice until the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and it was renamed Medicare
Advantage by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003. For the sake of consistency we shall refer to the program by its name during most
of the period we examine: Medicare+Choice.
3. In the past, CMS also wrote cost contracts with HMOs under which HMOs cared
for Medicare beneficiaries on a fee-for-service basis. This paper is concerned exclusively
with Medicare risk contracts.
4. Distinct from tracing a supply curve, this paper estimates the number of suppliers
in the market as a function of the price, controlling for estimated costs.
5. Physician Payment Review Commission (1996), GAO Report 97-113 (1997). Pizer
and Frakt (2002) study M+C data from 1999–2001 and conclude that competition between
plans (measured by the Herfindahl index) is strongly correlated with lower premiums and
greater plan benefits.
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Consistent with the fact that the number of M+C plans in a market
is correlated with the generosity of benefits offered to enrollees, the
probability that an individual involuntarily disenrolled from an M+C
HMO will subsequently enroll in another M+C HMO is positively
correlated with the number of M+C HMOs remaining in the market
(Booske et al., 2002; Laschober et al., 1999). Among those with a choice
of five or more M+C HMOs, 89% enrolled in another M+C HMO,
compared to 54% of those with only one M+C HMO available to join.6
A greater number of M+C HMOs in a market may cushion the adverse
consequences of involuntary disenrollment.
Beneficiaries and policymakers have also recognized the impor-
tance of the number of plans serving a market. A recent poll indicates
that four out of five senior citizens believe that it is important for seniors
to have a choice of health plans (PR Newswire, 2003). Moreover, Pres-
ident Bush has called for strengthening the M+C program to provide
greater choice of plans for senior citizens (PR Newswire, 2002).
Nevertheless, we recognize that other outcomes may be interesting
as well and offer two extensions. One examines the impact of CMS
payment on the likelihood that the county market is served by at least
one HMO and the other examines the impact of payment on the HMO
penetration rate into Medicare in that market.
Under the current law, those eligible for Medicare Part A (Hospital
Insurance) and enrolled in Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical
Insurance) may enroll in a managed care plan, if available.7 Traditional
fee-for-service Medicare is still available to all Medicare beneficiaries.
Figure 1 depicts the number of Medicare managed care enrollees from
1985 to 2001, a period during which enrollment grew from 440,000 in
1985 to a peak of 6.35 million in 1999 before falling to 5.6 million in 2001.8
In 2001, 15% of all Medicare beneficiaries chose M+C.9
The continuous growth in enrollment during 1985–1999 masks
considerable change in the number of HMO plans participating in
M+C. Figure 2 shows that many plans exited M+C in the late 1980s,
but the number of participating plans rose considerably during the
early- and mid-1990s. Between 1998 and 2001, however, the number
of participating plans fell from 346 to 174.
As a result of the reduced participation of HMOs, many Medicare
beneficiaries have been involuntarily disenrolled from the program. The
6. Laschober et al. (1999).
7. Medicare beneficiaries may enroll only in those HMOs with a risk contract from
CMS to serve the beneficiary’s county of residence. Medicare beneficiaries suffering from
end-stage renal diseases are not eligible for Medicare managed care.
8. HCFA Medicare Managed Care Contract Reports are the source of the data shown
in Figures 1 and 2.
9. HCFA Medicare Managed Care January Contract Report (2001).









































FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF MEDICARE+CHOICE PLANS
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number of Medicare beneficiaries involuntarily disenrolled from M+C
plans at the close of recent years totaled 407,000 in 1998, 327,000 in 1999,
934,000 in 2000, and 536,000 in 2001.10
Our results suggest that CMS has consistently underestimated
the payment necessary to support HMOs in rural, sparsely populated
areas. We also find that it would require a large incremental payment
to support HMOs in M+C for the final 10% of counties or final 10% of
Medicare beneficiaries.
This paper does not take a position how many M+C HMOs
should be supported in each county and does not attempt to quan-
tify the benefits of diversity. Ultimately, policy makers may well de-
cide the benefits are not worth the cost. Moreover, this paper does
not estimate how much needs to be paid in the future; this paper
is only able to examine the relationship between payment and par-
ticipation retrospectively. A prediction about payments necessary to
support given numbers of HMOs in the future depends on informa-
tion about changing costs in local health care markets that is not yet
available.
Three studies have modeled the decisions of individual HMOs to
participate in the M+C market (Adamache and Rossiter, 1986; Porell
and Wallack, 1990; and Abraham et al. 2000). Each of these studies used
HMO-level data, which entails two complicated problems, neither of
which is addressed by the three referenced studies.
The first problem is that, in counties that have noncompetitive
M+C markets, the entry decision of each firm is a function of the entry
decisions of all potential participants in that market. Complicating the
problem, some potential participants are not observed because they
chose not to enter.
The second problem inherent in the use of HMO-level data to
study this problem is the likelihood of multiple equilibria. For example,
a county may be able to support two HMOs in its M+C market, but
it may be largely random which two HMOs participate. Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991a) show that multiple equilibria occur in simultaneous-move
models under very general conditions.
In this paper, we study the aggregate number of HMOs participat-
ing at the county level. This avoids the problems of simultaneity and
multiple equilibria because we are concerned only with the number
of firms that can be supported in the county, not the identities of the
individual HMOs.
We also relate to a more recent literature on HMO participation in
the M+C program. Pai and Clement (1999) study the determinants of
10. HCFA (1999), Laschober et al. (1999), HCFA (2000), GAO (2001).
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whether an HMO signs a risk contract with CMS to participate in M+C.
Penrod, McBride, and Mueller (2001) study the relationship between
CMS payment and plan enrollment in 1996, prior to the payment reform
created by the BBA of 1997. Liu (2002) studies the difference in M+C
activity between urban and rural areas.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the
natural experiment that provides much of our identification. Section
2 outlines our method for examining the relationship between CMS
payment rates and the extent of HMO participation. Section 3 describes
the data used in this study, Section 4 presents the results of the empirical
work, and Section 5 presents extensions.
2. HMO Payment Reform
Much of our identification of the effect of payment holding constant
costs comes from a natural experiment. Congress, in the Balanced
Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, changed the CMS formula for setting payment
levels effective 1998.
During the early part of our sample (1993–1997), county CMS pay-
ments were set according to the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act (TEFRA). Under TEFRA, HMOs were paid 95% of the projected
average fee-for-service costs of Medicare beneficiaries in that county,
multiplied by a risk-adjustment factor based on the enrollee’s age, sex,
Medicaid eligibility, institutional status, and working status. HMOs
were paid only 95% of projected local costs because CMS expected that
HMOs could save 5% by operating more efficiently and with fewer
unnecessary procedures than fee-for-service providers. TEFRA allowed
Medicare HMOs to earn a rate of profit equal to that earned in their non-
Medicare business.11 Subject to CMS approval, HMOs were allowed to
charge a premium to enrollees in exchange for services not covered by
Medicare.
The TEFRA payment formula was criticized for overpaying
HMOs. Despite the strategy of paying HMOs 95% of projected average
fee-for-service costs, several studies concur that it cost CMS more to
enroll beneficiaries in M+C than if they had remained in fee-for-service
Medicare.12 The reason is that enrollees in M+C have proven to be
systematically healthier than fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries and
as a result the medical expenses of the M+C enrollees were far lower
than 95% of average fee-for-service costs.
11. If the expected rate of Medicare profit exceeds that of non-Medicare business, the
HMO must either return the excess to CMS, provide additional benefits, or reduce its
co-payments and deductibles.
12. GAO Report 00-161 (2000). Favorable selection occurred even though HMOs are
prohibited by law from selecting enrollees on the basis of health status.
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The TEFRA payment formula was also criticized for creating
disparities in payments across counties; in particular, few HMOs entered
rural counties. It was also argued that tying managed care payments to
local fee-for-service charges rewarded counties that were inefficient at
providing fee-for-service care.
Concerned about the rising cost of caring for Medicare benefi-
ciaries, Congress passed the BBA of 1997, which changed the formula
determining the amount HMOs are paid under the program.13 Since
1998, CMS pays HMOs the greatest of the following three rates:14
1. A blend of a national rate and an area-specific rate. The blend
is intended to reduce the variation in payments across counties
by increasing the lowest rates and decreasing the highest rates. If
total projected payments exceed a budget limit, the blended rate
is reduced. The budget limits have typically been binding, forcing
reductions so great that only in the year 2000 did any county receive
the blended payment.
2. A national minimum payment, adjusted annually, intended to in-
crease the rates in historically lower-rate counties where M+C plans
generally have not been offered.
3. A minimum increase over the previous year’s payment, which is
intended to somewhat protect high payment areas. For 1998, 1999,
2000, and January and February of 2001, the minimum increase over
the previous year’s payment was 2%. For March–December of 2001
the minimum increase was 3%.
The BBA also affected HMO profits by increasing their adminis-
trative burdens and charging them user fees (which amounted to $95
million in both 1998 and 1999), the proceeds of which are used to inform
Medicare beneficiaries about their managed-care options.15
There is one final component of HMO payment in this program.
The Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 mandates that CMS,
starting in the year 2000, pay bonuses of 5% the first year, and 3%
the second year, to HMOs that offer M+C in previously unserved
counties.16
13. Some provisions of the BBA were amended by the Balanced Budget Refinement
Act of 1999 and the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection
Act of 2000.
14. In addition, the BBA requires CMS to adjust payments by the health status of
plan enrollees. The risk adjustment will be phased in; payments in 2001 are 10% risk
adjusted and 90% adjusted only for demographic factors. The full amount of the payment
will be risk-adjusted by 2004. The BBA also requires that graduate medical education
reimbursements be phased out of the county payments.
15. The BBA also dropped the requirement that plan service areas had to consist of
contiguous counties.
16. The bonus is paid to the first HMO to enter a previously unserved county, but if
several HMOs enter on the same date they each receive the bonus.
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3. Methods
The relationship between exogenously set payment rates and the num-
ber of firms in the market depends on many factors. Important factors
include the nature of competition in the industry, the shape of the cost
curves, information, and the extent to which quality competition is
possible. Moreover, the number of firms in the market is determined by
a dynamic process. Thus strategic concerns and expectations regarding
factors such as whether firms interpret shocks to demand as permanent
or transitory are also important. Models could be constructed which
have the property that the number of firms rises with an exogenously
set payment rate and others could be constructed in which the surplus
created by rising payment rates is dissipated in ways other than by
increased entry into the market. Multiple equilibria are possible (Pakes
and McGuire, 1994; Sutton, 1991). Nevertheless, it is commonly true (but
not always the case) that economic models predict that an increase in an
exogenously set price leads to a greater number of firms in the market.
We are not interested in testing any particular model, but instead desire
to measure the magnitude of the relationship between price and number
of firms.
Our empirical model follows the approach outlined in Bresnahan
and Reiss, (1991b); if N HMOs are active in a market, we assume that
the Nth HMO earns zero economic profits when
∏
N
(P) = [P − AVC(qN, W)] 1Nd(Z)S − r F = 0, (1)
where P is the CMS payment, AVC(•) is the average variable cost
function of the HMO, d(•) is the probability that a Medicare beneficiary
enrolls in Medicare managed care, Z is a vector of variables that affect
the probability of enrollment, S is the number of Medicare beneficiaries,
r is the interest rate, and F is the fixed cost of entry. W is a vector of
variables affecting costs, and q is the number of Medicare managed-care
enrollees in the HMO (i.e. qN = 1N d(Z)S).
We assume that profit has an additively separable unobserved






It is assumed that the error term is normally distributed, uniform
within markets, independent across markets, and independent of the
regressors. These assumptions permit the use of the ordered probit to
estimate entry thresholds. The dependent variable is the number of
HMOs participating in M+C in a county.
HMO Participation in Medicare+Choice 551
A county will have N active HMOs when the Nth HMO to

























where (·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
We estimate the latent profit function using a reduced form ap-
proach. Cameron and Trivedi (1998) conclude that when the data gener-
ating process is a continuous latent variable (in our case unobserved
profits), an ordered model should be used in place of a count data
regression model. Accordingly, we estimate the model using an ordered
probit regression, in which the number of participating HMOs in a given
county in a given year is a function of payment and the factors that affect
variable costs, market size, the probability of enrollment, and fixed costs.
The ordered probit specification provides a convenient way to
relate the number of firms in the market to price, costs, and variables
related to market size. It is not designed to differentiate between any of
the many models that might give rise to the relationship between price
and number of firms in the market.
Ordered probit regression will provide us with threshold values of
CMS payments for HMO participation. If βP represents the coefficient
on CMS payment, β represents the vector of all other coefficients, and
X represents the set of regressors other than CMS payment, then the
minimum CMS payment P needed to support the participation of N
HMOs is: PN = λN − Xβ
βP
,
where λN is the cutoff in the ordered probit regression associated with N
HMOs.17 We predict that a higher CMS payment, controlling for observ-
able factors that affect costs, will be associated with the participation of
a greater number of HMOs. The payment thresholds we calculate are
based on current payment and observed market characteristics; to the
extent that unobserved factors, such as firm expectations about future
17. If the dependent variable in an ordered probit regression has M categories, the
cutoffs represent fitted values above which the model predicts that the dependent variable
will equal m for m = 1, . . . , M.
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strategic interactions with rival HMOs, influence the HMO participation
decision, our estimates of payment thresholds will be biased.
4. Data
In this section, we define HMO participation in county markets and
explain how we control for each component of the profit function intro-
duced in the previous section. The data used in this paper come from two
sources. The CMS is the source for data on M+C enrollment, Medicare
managed care contracts with HMOs, CMS payments by county, and
input price indices. Plan-county data are aggregated to the HMO level
and HMO-level data are aggregated to the county level.18 The second
major source of data for this paper is the Area Resource File (ARF),
which provides medical and demographic data at the county level.19
The sample contains every county in the contiguous 48 United
States plus Washington D.C. for each year 1993–2001. Counties represent
distinct markets for Medicare managed care. A market has traditionally
been defined as a region in which a single price prevails for a homoge-
nous good20 and CMS sets M+C payments on a county-by-county basis.
Furthermore, exit and entry occur at the county level; CMS requires
separate contracts from HMOs for each county in which they wish to
offer Medicare managed care.
The dependent variable used in this paper is the number of HMOs
participating in a county in a given year; it is top-coded at six or more;
Table I lists the number of counties with a given number of HMOs
participating in M+C by year.21 For the purposes of this study, a risk
plan is defined as participating in a county M+C market if CMS market
penetration files indicate that the plan has enrolled at least 0.5% of the
county’s Medicare-eligible residents.22
18. A plan is a uniform set of benefits and premiums. Each HMO may offer multiple
plans. In our data we find only 37 counties in which a single HMO offers two plans.
19. The Area Resource File (ARF) is a compilation of data from a variety of sources.
Unless otherwise noted, the original source of data taken from the ARF is the 1990 Census
of Population and Housing.
20. See, for example, Marshall (1920).
21. We top-code the dependent variable because it can be difficult to estimate an
ordered probit for values of the dependent variable that appear rarely in the data.
22. The enrollment data used to determine HMO participation is that for December for
1993–1997 and 2000, October for 1998–1999, and March in 2001. December reports are not
used for 1998 and 1999 because the figures listed in those December reports are actually
from the following January. We exclude plans that have enrolled less than 0.5% of eligible
residents because plans with such low county enrollment may not actually be operating
in the county; CMS market penetration files list enrollees by their county of residence
instead of the county in which they have enrolled in an HMO, and as a result there are
many plan enrollees found in counties where the plan does not have a contract to operate.
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Table I.
Number of Counties with a Given Number of HMOs





Medicare+Choice 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0 2,816 2,728 2,569 2,401 2,289 2,230 2,210 2,273 2,415
1 166 202 281 309 317 329 387 366 336
2 55 81 114 155 188 205 199 189 183
3 21 30 56 101 105 126 126 116 88
4 4 22 28 48 84 80 74 70 23
5 7 3 14 43 51 57 34 27 14
6–10 5 8 12 17 40 47 44 34 15
Total Number 3,074 3,074 3,074 3,074 3,074 3,074 3,074 3,074 3,074
of Counties
Data: CMS Medicare managed care market penetration files, 1993–2001.
Table II.
Percent of All Medicare Beneficiaries Living in





Medicare+Choice 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0 61.84 55.96 44.47 35.25 31.73 30.23 29.79 31.35 35.60
1 15.42 14.25 16.42 13.87 10.44 9.46 10.53 11.39 14.38
2 10.09 11.50 13.41 12.33 11.09 10.68 10.17 11.46 16.32
3 3.77 5.90 8.25 13.28 11.84 12.10 14.36 14.45 13.51
4 2.08 5.42 6.45 8.15 11.48 10.86 12.36 10.30 5.43
5 2.21 0.61 3.06 7.69 8.75 10.63 5.82 5.41 3.47
6–10 4.59 6.35 7.94 9.44 14.67 16.04 16.97 15.63 11.28
Table I indicates that the number of counties with zero HMOs
participating in M+C fell every year from 1993–1999, but recently has
risen each year 1999–2001. In 2001, 78.6% of counties had zero HMOs
participating in M+C.
Table II presents the percent of all Medicare beneficiaries living in
counties with a given number of HMOs participating in this program
in each year. Table II shows a similar trend to that observed in Table I;
the percent of Medicare beneficiaries living in counties with no HMOs
participating in M+C fell from 1993–1999 but then rose in 1999–2001.
554 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Table III.
Percent of Counties with at Least One HMO Active
in Medicare+Choice, by Quintile of Medicare
Beneficiaries in 1990
Quintile of Medicare Beneficiaries in 1990
Year 1 2 3 4 5
1993 4.7 2.4 3.9 7.5 23.5
1994 5.4 3.6 6.0 10.7 30.6
1995 7.6 4.9 9.8 15.3 44.6
1996 9.8 7.2 13.0 22.4 57.2
1997 9.9 9.3 17.1 27.8 63.7
1998 10.9 10.4 18.9 31.4 65.8
1999 7.6 12.8 20.3 33.3 66.4
2000 6.5 12.4 17.1 31.1 63.4
2001 4.2 9.4 13.8 22.6 57.2
Number of Counties 615 615 615 615 614
Minimum Number of Medicare 14 1,482 2,783 4,714 9,718
Beneficiaries in Quintile
Maximum Number of Medicare 1,479 2,781 4,708 9,680 877,581
Beneficiaries in Quintile
Data: CMS market penetration files, 1993–2001, and area resource file.
Table II also indicates that in 2001, 11.3% of beneficiaries lived in counties
with six or more HMOs active in M+C.
Although 78.6% of counties in 2001 had no HMO participating in
M+C, only 35.6% of all Medicare beneficiaries lived in those counties.
This is due to the fact that HMO participation in this program is strongly
correlated with the number of Medicare beneficiaries residing in a
county. Table III lists the percent of counties with at least one HMO
participating in M+C, by the quintile of its population of Medicare
beneficiaries. The table shows that counties in the fifth (most populous)
quintile are several times more likely to have a participating HMO than
are counties in the first quintile (least populous). The positive correlation
between the size of the Medicare population and the probability that an
HMO participates in M+C was stronger in 2001 than in 1993.
Figure 3 depicts the number of HMOs participating in M+C by
county of the US in the year 2001. The map confirms the pattern observed
in Table III that populous counties are more likely to support HMO
participation in M+C.
4.1. Variable Definitions
To recap, the profit function for all HMOs in a market, and thus the
number of HMOs participating in a county is posited to be a function







Number of Participating HMOs
FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF HMOS PARTICIPATING IN MEDICARE+
CHOICE PER COUNTY IN 2001
of the CMS payment P, average variable cost AVC, the probability of
enrollment in Medicare managed care of the representative Medicare
eligible d, the number of Medicare eligibles in the market S, and fixed
costs of entry, F. These variables are defined as follows:
P: Payment Our regressor of interest is the CMS per-enrollee per-month
payment specific to the county. We enter the CMS payment directly and
also interact it with an indicator for the BBA regime (1998–2001), which
allows the effect of the CMS payment to vary before and after the BBA
took effect. These payment variables include bonuses, paid only in 2000
and 2001, equal to 5% of the per-enrollee payment for the first year,
and 3% of the per-enrollee payment for the second year, that an HMO
operates in a previously unserved county.
Although in practice the per-capita payments of CMS to HMOs are
adjusted to take into account the demographic and (more recently) risk
factors associated with the enrollee, we do not make these adjustments
and thus the payment used in our empirical work represents the
payment for the average enrollee. The payment for the average enrollee
by county of the US in the year 2001 is depicted in Figure 4.
Summary statistics of the CMS per-enrollee monthly payments
are listed in Table IV in nominal dollars. Table IV indicates that the
average CMS county monthly payment per enrollee rose each year in
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Table IV.
Summary Statistics of Monthly Per-Enrollee CMS
Payments, by Year
Year Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
1993 301.86 55.46 168.15 598.65
1994 314.72 58.29 171.07 653.44
1995 332.43 62.99 177.32 678.90
1996 372.13 70.58 207.31 881.35
1997 394.78 76.69 220.92 767.35
1998 417.09 62.99 367.00 782.70
1999 427.33 62.69 379.84 798.35
2000 449.78 56.85 401.52 809.28
2001 (Jan–Feb) 460.39 56.66 414.88 825.46
2001 (Mar–Dec) 498.82 41.70 475.00 833.55
Source: CMS Medicare managed care historical payment files, 1993–2001.
Notes: Figures are in nominal dollars. The BIPA of 2000 raised payments to HMOs effective March 2001. Payments do







Medicare Managed Care Payment Rates
FIGURE 4. MEDICARE+CHOICE MONTHLY PER ENROLLEE PAY-
MENT RATES BY COUNTY IN 2001
1993–2001. The variance in the county payments rose until 1997, when
the BBA was passed in part to reduce disparities in payments across
counties. Since 1997, the variance in payments across counties has fallen
each year. CMS payments to HMOs are constant during a calendar
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year; the exception to this rule is 2001, when payments were raised
effective March 2001 by the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000. We use the March payment
rate for 2001 because the dependent variable is also created using March
data.
AVC: Average Variable Costs We do not observe the average variable
costs of HMOs. We assume that average variable costs in county c in
year t, denoted AVCc,t, have the following structure:
AVCc,t = βAAc,1991
(





1 + PB,t − PB,1991
PB,1991
)




Ac,1991 is the average Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) reim-
bursement per enrollee in county c in 1991; this amount is multiplied
by the percent change in Part A costs since 1991, as measured by the
CMS Hospital Input Price Index, which is represented in the equation
above by PA,t. The Hospital Input Price Index tracks changes in the
prices of hospital inputs. Likewise, Bc,1991 is the average Medicare Part
B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) reimbursement per enrollee in
county c in 1991; this amount is multiplied by the percent change in
Part B costs since 1991, as measured by the CMS Medicare Economic
Index, which is represented in the equation above by PB,t. The Medicare
Economic Index tracks changes in the prices of inputs to outpatient care.
It should be noted that the change in costs that we observe over time
is that due to prices, not necessarily utilization. It should also be noted
that the Hospital Input Price Index and the Medicare Economic Index are
nationwide indices and therefore all of the difference across counties in
costs is due to the baseline difference in costs in 1991. In our regression
model, we will enter the Part A and Part B costs separately because
we do not wish to constrain their coefficients to be equal; costs in the
two areas may have different impacts on the likelihood that HMOs will
participate.
In the average variable costs equation listed above, Xc is a vector of
county characteristics that may affect costs, specifically: the number of
general practitioners in 1990, the number of registered nurses in 1990, the
number of hospitals in 1993, and median rent in 1990.23 We also include
23. The source of the data on number of doctors is the American Medical Association
Physician Masterfile, and that for the number of hospitals is the American Hospital
Association Survey of Hospitals.
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as regressors population density and the percent of the population that
is urban because geographically dispersed populations may be more
costly to serve. Finally, year-specific costs are captured by It, an indicator
variable that equals one if the observation is for year t.
S: Size of the Market We control for the size of the county market using
the number of Medicare beneficiaries in the county in 1990. We also
include the percent change in this number 1980–90 to account for the
fact that HMOs may prefer to enter growing markets.
F: Fixed Costs of Entry We control for two factors that Brown and Gold
(1999) suggest affect the fixed costs of entry into the M+C market. The
first is whether the HMO already operates in the commercial market
in the county. An HMO that has already sunk the costs of establishing
a network of health care providers in the county may find it cheaper
to enter the Medicare market; that is, there may be economies of scope
to participating in multiple managed-care markets in the same county.
HMOs that historically participated in the commercial market of the
county may in general face lower barriers to entering the M+C market.
We do not simply control for the number of HMOs participating in
the county’s commercial managed care market; because an HMO could
enter a county’s commercial market for the purpose of subsequently
entering its Medicare managed care market, current participation in the
commercial market is endogenous. Instead, we control for the number
of HMOs in the county in 1980, before the TEFRA of 1982 created the
modern M+C market.24 We also control for the likelihood of HMOs
participating in the county commercial market using the percent of the
workforce in manufacturing or white-collar jobs in 1990. The presence
of these types of employees proxies for the presence of employers likely
to demand commercial managed care for their employees.
The second factor that affects the fixed cost of entering a county
M+C market is whether an HMO participates in nearby counties. It may
be cheaper for an HMO to enter a county adjacent to its current service
area because the HMO may already be familiar with local providers
and have acquired information about the local market. To proxy for the
likelihood of participating in adjacent counties, we control for the total
number of Medicare beneficiaries in 1990 in all adjacent counties and its
percent growth in 1980–1990.
d: Probability that Medicare Eligibles will Enroll in Medicare Managed
Care It has repeatedly been found that relatively healthy Medicare
24. The National HMO Census of Prepaid Plans is source of the data on HMO
participation in commercial markets.
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beneficiaries are the most likely to enroll in managed care.25 In order
to capture cross-county differences in the proportion of healthy benefi-
ciaries (and therefore demand for Medicare managed care), we control
for per capita income, the poverty rate among the county’s elderly, the
percent of adults with a high school diploma, and the percent of adults
with a college degree.26 Each of these variables was measured in 1990.
Summary statistics for the variables used in this paper appear in
Table V.
We exclude from the regression the characteristics of the individual
participating HMOs because, as mentioned earlier, HMO entry into
M+C is an example of a multiple-agent discrete-move game. It is likely
that multiple equilibria exist, and that the number of firms participating
is determined but which individual HMOs participate is to some extent
random.
5. Empirical Results
The results of the ordered probit regression of the number of HMOs
participating in M+C are presented in Table VI. For all the analyses
reported in this paper, the number of Medicare beneficiaries residing
in the county was used as a population weight in the regression, and
standard errors are cluster-corrected to account for possible dependence
in errors within each county over time.
The coefficients on CMS payment and CMS payment interacted
with BBA regime are positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level, which is consistent with our hypothesis that controlling for costs, a
higher payment is associated with the participation of more HMOs. The
coefficient on estimated Part A (Hospital Insurance) costs in a county
is statistically significant and negative; this is consistent with the view
that HMOs are wary of entering counties with sicker patients (who
typically have higher hospital costs), for fear of adverse selection and
lower profits. The coefficient on Part B (Supplementary Medical) costs
is also negative but not statistically significant.
As described in Section 2, the coefficients presented in Table VI
can be used to calculate the CMS payments necessary in each county
to support a given number of HMOs. These payment thresholds are
25. See, for example, Chapter 15 of Physician Payment Review Commission (1996),
GAO Report 97-160 (1997), and the summary in Glied (2000). Possible reasons that the
relatively healthy are more likely to enroll in managed care are that they are less likely to
have an established health care provider and that they may be less risk averse.
26. We assume that the per capita income and education of Medicare beneficiaries
track those of the entire adult population in the county. The source of data on the poverty
rate among the elderly is the Bureau of Census’ Small Area Income Poverty Estimates and
that for per capita income is the US Department of Commerce.
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Table VI.
Ordered Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: Number of HMOs
Participating in Medicare+Choice in County
Variable Coefficient Z Score
Payment
CMS Payment 0.0092 6.68
CMS Payment ∗ Indicator for 1998–2001 0.0027 4.59









Variables Affecting Average Variable Costs
Average Medicare Part A Costs −0.0008 −4.39
Average Medicare Part B Costs −.00008 −0.03
Number of General Practitioners 0.0018 2.02
Number of Registered Nurses −0.0002 −2.83
Number of Hospitals 0.0199 2.00
Median Rent 0.0027 3.96
Population Density 0.000002 0.80
Percent Population in Urban Areas 0.0080 3.84
Measures of the Size of the Market
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries 0.000004 1.14
Percent Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries −0.5307 −2.34
Variables Affecting Fixed Costs of Entry
Number of HMOs in County in 1980 −0.0127 −0.23
Percent Workforce in Manufacturing 0.0009 0.14
Percent Workforce White Collar 0.0526 4.12
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries 0.000002 4.48
in All Adjacent Counties
Percent Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries 0.6245 1.89
in All Adjacent Counties
Variables Affecting the Probability of Enrollment
Per Capita Income −0.00003 −1.95
Poverty Rate Among Elderly −3.779 −2.94
Percent of Adults with High School Diploma 0.0054 0.47
Percent of Adults with College Degree −0.034 −2.73
Number of Observations 27,666
Log Likelihood −31,933.94
Notes: Z scores reflect cluster−corrections of standard errors by county.
Coefficients on indicator variables for missing values are omitted.
Regression is weighted by Medicare population of county.
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Table VII.
Estimated Maximum Payment Necessary to Support
a Given Number of HMOs in Medicare+Choice in a
Certain Percent of Counties in Year 2001
Minimum Number of HMOs Participating in County
Percent of Counties
with at Least N
HMOs Participating 1 2 3 4 5 6
10 481.25 538.80 593.80 649.33 698.89 741.98
(9.56) (16.36) (26.02) (43.25) (54.62) (66.31)
20 517.57 575.12 630.12 685.64 735.20 778.29
(12.51) (27.12) (37.99) (55.60) (66.96) (78.71)
30 541.37 598.92 653.92 709.45 759.01 802.10
(18.31) (33.63) (44.79) (62.43) (73.74) (85.50)
40 561.64 619.19 674.19 729.71 779.27 822.36
(21.83) (37.33) (48.63) (66.28) (77.59) (89.33)
50 580.95 638.50 693.50 749.03 798.59 841.67
(24.62) (40.20) (51.54) (69.20) (80.49) (92.21)
60 602.74 660.29 715.29 770.82 820.38 863.46
(27.61) (43.23) (54.60) (72.27) (83.55) (95.28)
70 623.46 681.01 736.01 791.53 841.10 884.18
(31.18) (46.85) (58.21) (75.90) (87.19) (98.90)
80 650.56 708.11 763.11 818.64 868.20 911.28
(35.42) (51.08) (62.43) (80.11) (91.42) (103.11)
90 686.54 744.09 799.09 854.62 904.18 947.26
(39.52) (55.12) (66.41) (84.00) (95.31) (106.98)
100 877.26 934.81 989.81 1, 045.34 1, 094.90 1, 137.99
(61.73) (75.13) (85.23) (101.65) (112.35) (123.22)
Notes: Calculated using ordered probit coefficients reported in Table VI.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
presented in Table VII. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in
parentheses below the estimated payment thresholds.27
The payment threshold necessary to support a given number of
Medicare HMOs varies by county. Table VII presents the year 2001
thresholds for ten counties: the counties at every tenth percentile in
the distribution. In order to support a single HMO in M+C in 10% of all
counties, it is necessary for CMS to pay $481 per average enrollee per
month in the marginal county. In order to support one HMO in M+C
27. Derivation of standard errors for the thresholds is difficult because the thresholds
are non-linear functions of several random variables. We follow the recommendation of
Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and conduct 200 replications to estimate the bootstrap standard
errors. The standard errors may be irrelevant because our sample is the entire population
of counties in the contiguous 48 states. However, the standard errors are meaningful if
one allows for measurement error in the dependent variable or one interprets the sample
(which covers 1993–2001) as drawn from all possible years.
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in half of all counties, the payment in the marginal county must be at
least $581. To support a single HMO in every county, CMS would have
to pay $877 in the marginal county.
Table VII also lists the CMS payment thresholds necessary to sup-
port multiple HMOs in county M+C markets. CMS may desire multiple
HMOs in each market because the competition between the HMOs for
market share leads to lower out-of-pocket costs and additional benefits
for enrollees. A comparison across columns of Table VII suggests that
$50–$60 more per enrollee per month is necessary to support each
additional HMO.
There is also an interesting pattern across rows. The monthly
payment necessary to support a given number of HMOs in 10% more
counties is less than $50 until the last 10% of counties. To ensure that the
last 10% of counties also support N HMOs requires a dramatically larger
increment in payment, roughly $190. There exists a group of counties,
amounting to no more than 10% of all counties, in which it is extremely
expensive to support HMOs in M+C.
Table VIII compares the mean characteristics of two groups of
counties: those in which CMS payments in the year 2001 were more
than the estimated payment necessary to support the participation of
one HMO in M+C, and those in which the payment was less than that
threshold. The table also lists the difference in means and the t-statistic
associated with the test of the hypothesis that the means are equal across
the two groups of counties.
In the year 2001, 561 counties in our sample received CMS pay-
ments that exceeded the estimated payment necessary to support one
HMO, while 2,513 counties were assigned payments less than the single-
HMO threshold. Table VIII indicates that counties assigned payments
greater than the estimated single-HMO threshold have both higher CMS
payments and higher Part A and B Medicare costs than the counties
assigned payments less than the threshold. In addition, the counties
with above-threshold payments have many more hospitals and general
practitioners, much larger populations of Medicare beneficiaries, and
have in general better educated and wealthier populations. Each of these
differences is statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
If a below-threshold payment can be interpreted as an underesti-
mate by CMS of costs in that county, then our results suggest that CMS
tends to underestimate the costs of HMO participation in sparsely pop-
ulated counties. Several studies noted that, under the TEFRA payment
scheme that was used prior to 1998, rural counties were particularly
unlikely to be served by HMOs.28 Passage of the BBA was intended
28. See, for example, Serrato, Brown, and Bergeron (1995).
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Table VIII.
Difference in Mean Characteristics Between
Counties with Actual Payments Above and Below
Estimated Payment Threshold for One HMO to
Participate in Medicare+Choice in the Year 2001
Mean for Mean for
Counties Counties t-Statistic
with Actual with Actual for
Payment > Payment < Difference Equality
County Characteristic Threshold Threshold in Means of Means
Number of Participating HMOs, 2001 1.50 0.15 1.34 19.75
Monthly CMS Payment, 2001 546.35 497.10 49.24 20.23
Average Medicare Part A Costs, 1991 1,957.62 1,832.73 124.89 6.13
Average Medicare Part B Costs, 1991 1,226.81 1,054.92 171.88 14.27
Number of General Practitioners, 1990 81.76 9.15 72.61 10.66
Number of Hospitals, 1993 6.72 1.54 5.18 11.38
Per Capita Income, 1993 20,356.56 15,995.37 4,361.19 21.65
Poverty Rate Among Elderly, 1990 10.08 18.73 −8.64 −30.52
% Adults High School Graduates, 1990 78.29 67.59 10.70 31.01
% Adults College Graduates, 1990 20.59 11.82 8.77 25.38
Number Medicare Beneficiaries, 1990 39,644.31 4,399.75 35,244.56 12.56
% Population Urban, 1990 72.34 40.79 31.54 29.89
Population Density, 1994 912.11 51.47 860.64 6.22
Number of Counties 561 2,513
to eliminate such disparities by raising payments more quickly in low-
payment than high-payment counties. We find that even 3 years after
the BBA took effect, counties with CMS payment insufficient to support
HMO participation tend to be far less populous than counties that
receive what we estimate to be sufficient payment.29
Table IX lists the estimated percent of all counties in which a given
number of HMOs would be supported for various monthly payments
in 2001. The first row of the table confirms that if the monthly payment
were zero, then HMOs would participate in M+C in 0% of counties.
The first few rows of the table reveal an interesting pattern: one county
(which represents 0.03% of all counties) requires the lowest payment to
support HMOs in M+C. In particular, this county requires only $200
29. Another piece of evidence that the BBA has not worked as intended appears in
Table III; specifically, the relationship between the number of Medicare beneficiaries in a
county and the probability of a participating Medicare HMO is stronger in 2001 than in
1993.
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Table IX.
Estimated Percent of All Counties with a Given
Number of HMOs Participating in
Medicare+Choice, by Hypothetical County
Payment Rate in Year 2001
Number of HMOs Participating in County
Monthly
Payment ($) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08)
100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05)
200 99.97 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
(0.13) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
300 99.84 0.10 .03 0.03 0 0 0
(0.42) (0.32) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
400 98.70 1.01 0.20 0.07 0 0.03 0
(1.23) (0.93) (0.27) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
500 85.91 10.21 2.86 0.75 0.16 0.03 0.07
(1.97) (1.55) (0.67) (0.29) (0.94) (0.06) (0.06)
600 41.18 28.37 19.06 8.20 2.41 0.49 0.29
(10.51) (3.69) (5.40) (2.31) (.72) (0.21) (0.13)
700 7.29 15.03 24.53 27.26 15.68 6.54 3.68
(8.74) (8.26) (4.83) (6.84) (5.89) (2.62) (1.59)
800 0.55 2.21 7.09 16.36 23.26 21.57 28.95
(3.26) (7.40) (8.84) (7.63) (7.11) (7.02) (12.75)
900 0 0.23 0.62 2.54 7.51 12.39 76.71
(0.85) (3.09) (6.67) (11.57) (8.38) (7.16) (26.81)
1000 0 0 0 0.26 0.68 2.02 97.04
(0.14) (1.10) (2.92) (7.78) (9.60) (8.82) (26.52)
1100 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 99.74
(0.02) (0.24) (1.34) (3.81) (5.66) (8.19) (17.21)
1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
(0.00) (0.05) (0.42) (1.96) (2.83) (4.54) (8.77)
Notes: Calculated using ordered probit coefficients reported in Table VI.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
per enrollee per month to support one HMO, $300 monthly payments
to support three HMOs, and $400 a month to support five HMOs.30
At the other end of the spectrum, the last rows indicate that a
few counties require particularly large payments in order to support
30. The county that can support an HMO for the lowest payment is California’s Los
Angeles County. There is no single reason that LA County can support an HMO for
the lowest payment; instead, LA County has high values for many variables positively
correlated with HMO participation in M+C: high CMS payment, a large number of general
practitioners and hospitals, a high percentage of residents living in urban areas, and high
populations in neighboring counties.
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Table X.
Estimated Percent of All Medicare Beneficiaries
Living in Counties with a Given Number of HMOs
Participating in Medicare+Choice, by
Hypothetical County Payment Rate in Year 2001
Number of HMOs Participating in County
Monthly
Payment ($) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2.36) (0.80) (0.67) (0.06) (0.19) (0.94) (2.04)
100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2.92) (1.65) (1.20) (0.66) (0.49) (0.19) (2.19)
200 97.36 2.64 0 0 0 0 0
(3.46) (1.81) (1.70) (1.45) (0.64) (0.53) (2.19)
300 95.6 1.08 0.68 2.64 0 0 0
(5.26) (3.00) (1.66) (1.58) (1.63) (1.18) (2.24)
400 87.43 6.31 2.53 1.09 0 2.64 0
(8.97) (5.40) (2.53) (1.62) (1.45) (1.58) (2.67)
500 48.47 28.06 12.34 4.90 2.51 0.41 3.32
(4.74) (3.64) (3.34) (2.36) (1.68) (1.11) (2.85)
600 12.00 16.72 25.04 24.76 11.83 3.39 6.25
(3.76) (3.03) (4.54) (3.83) (2.65) (1.67) (3.39)
700 1.34 3.49 10.20 17.05 24.01 20.93 22.98
(2.26) (3.86) (3.60) (4.26) (4.73) (5.09) (6.25)
800 0.07 0.37 1.41 4.22 9.99 13.72 70.22
(0.70) (2.06) (3.71) (6.17) (5.09) (4.48) (17.61)
900 0 0.03 0.09 0.48 1.52 2.97 94.91
(0.16) (0.72) (1.90) (4.71) (5.38) (5.93) (17.26)
1000 0 0 0 0.03 0.10 0.37 99.51
(0.02) (0.22) (0.75) (2.33) (3.65) (4.85) (11.13)
1100 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 99.97
(0.00) (0.04) (0.29) (1.11) (1.68) (3.00) (5.73)
1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.48) (0.89) (1.46) (2.78)
Notes: Calculated using ordered probit coefficients reported in Table VI.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
any HMOs; the most expensive counties require no less than $800 a
month to support a single HMO in M+C. Table IX also indicates that
a payment between $500 and $600 a month would be necessary in the
marginal county to support some HMOs in half of US counties.
Table X reports the percent of beneficiaries who would live in
counties with the participation of varying numbers of HMOs by the
county payment rate in 2001. A comparison of Tables IX and X indicates
that the county requiring the lowest payment to support an HMO
represents only 0.03% of all counties but is home to 2.64% of all Medicare
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Table XI.
Estimated Maximum Payment Necessary to Support
a Given Number of HMOs in Medicare+Choice in
Counties Housing a Given Percent of All Medicare
Beneficiaries in Year 2001
Minimum Number of HMOs Participating in County
Percent of Medicare
Beneficiaries Living
in a County with at
Least N HMOs
Participating 1 2 3 4 5 6
10 383.39 440.94 495.93 551.46 601.02 644.11
(85.64) (77.36) (73.26) (70.52) (70.66) (72.00)
20 428.74 486.29 541.29 596.81 646.37 689.46
(39.03) (25.56) (18.73) (19.98) (27.55) (37.27)
30 453.11 510.66 565.65 621.18 670.74 713.83
(32.38) (19.09) (13.80) (20.91) (30.50) (41.44)
40 475.69 533.24 588.24 643.77 693.33 736.42
(23.22) (12.20) (13.16) (27.44) (38.24) (49.69)
50 496.09 553.64 608.64 664.16 713.73 756.81
(16.35) (11.34) (18.01) (34.42) (45.39) (57.01)
60 516.37 573.92 628.92 684.45 734.01 777.09
(10.95) (15.93) (25.18) (42.45) (53.57) (65.33)
70 539.03 596.58 651.58 707.11 756.67 799.76
(11.52) (23.97) (34.19) (51.77) (62.94) (74.73)
80 567.89 625.44 680.44 735.96 785.52 828.61
(16.51) (31.14) (41.96) (59.56) (70.73) (82.48)
90 610.38 667.93 722.93 778.46 828.02 871.11
(24.80) (40.22) (51.39) (68.98) (80.19) (91.92)
100 877.26 934.81 989.81 1,045.34 1,094.90 1,137.99
(55.11) (69.02) (79.50) (96.37) (107.23) (118.34)
Notes: Calculated using ordered probit coefficients reported in Table VI.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
beneficiaries. The fact that more heavily populated counties require
lower payments to support HMOs in this program explains why, for
a given payment, the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries living in a
county with a participating HMO will exceed the percentage of counties
with a participating HMO. Although Table IX indicated that a monthly
payment of $500–$600 in the marginal county was necessary to support
HMOs in half of US counties, Table X indicates that a payment of less
than $500 per month in the marginal county is sufficient to provide the
option of M+C to half of all Medicare beneficiaries.
Table XI lists the estimated maximum payment necessary in 2001
to have a certain percent of Medicare beneficiaries living in counties
with a given number of participating HMOs. To support one HMO
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in counties housing half of all Medicare beneficiaries would require a
payment of $496. A comparison across rows indicates that it is extremely
expensive to support HMOs in counties inhabited by the final 10% of
Medicare beneficiaries. To support a given number of HMOs for an
additional 10% of enrollees in most cases requires an increment of less
than $60; however, for the last 10% of beneficiaries, it requires a payment
increment of roughly $260.
One might be concerned that there are certain counties in which
it is extremely difficult to support HMOs in this program, and the
history of nonparticipation in these counties affects the estimates for
other counties. As a test of robustness, we re-estimated the models
of this paper excluding the 20% of counties with the fewest Medicare
beneficiaries. The results, not reported here but available upon request,
are consistent with those for the sample used in this paper and confirm
that the counties with the smallest population of Medicare beneficiaries
tend to be those requiring the largest payment to support HMOs in
M+C.
6. Extensions
In this section, we describe two extensions to this work in which
we consider additional outcomes of interest: the existence of any (as
opposed to the exact number) of HMOs participating in M+C in the
county, and the HMO market penetration rate.
First, we estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable
is an indicator variable that equals one if there are any active M+C
HMOs in the county; the set of independent variables is the same as in
the ordered probit regression. Table XII, which presents these results,
indicates that a $100 increase in CMS payment was associated with a
5% increase in the probability of at least one active HMO in the county
prior to when the BBA took effect, and an 11% increase in that probability
after the BBA took effect. A comparison of Tables VI and XII confirms
the common-sense prediction that variables that increase the number
of HMOs active in M+C also increase the probability that any HMOs
are active in M+C. For example, the number of general practitioners
and the median rent in the county, and the number of Medicare benefi-
ciaries in all surrounding counties are positively correlated with HMO
participation, while the number of RNs, per capita income, and the
poverty rate among the elderly are negatively correlated with HMO
participation.
As a second extension, we estimate models in which HMO market
penetration rate is the outcome of interest. The regressions using market
HMO Participation in Medicare+Choice 569
Table XII.
Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable for
Whether any HMO Participating in
Medicare+Choice in County
Change in
Variable Probability Z Score
Payment
CMS Payment 0.0005 3.53
CMS Payment ∗ Indicator for 1998–2001 0.0006 5.67









Variables Affecting Average Variable Costs
Average Medicare Part A Costs 0.000008 0.38
Average Medicare Part B Costs −0.00002 −0.69
Number of General Practitioners 0.0007 4.60
Number of Registered Nurses −0.00002 −2.02
Number of Hospitals 0.0007 0.41
Median Rent 0.0004 4.85
Population Density −0.000003 −2.18
Percent Population in Urban Areas −0.00009 −0.35
Measures of the Size of the Market
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries 0.000001 2.63
Percent Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries 0.0029 0.13
Variables Affecting Fixed Costs of Entry
Number of HMOs in County in 1980 0.0078 0.82
Percent Workforce in Manufacturing −0.0006 −0.93
Percent Workforce White Collar 0.0003 0.25
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries 0.000004 5.44
in All Adjacent Counties
Percent Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries 0.1099 3.53
in All Adjacent Counties
Variables Affecting the Probability of Enrollment
Per Capita Income −0.000008 −4.35
Poverty Rate Among Elderly −3.88 −3.07
Percent of Adults with High School Diploma 0.0030 2.74
Percent of Adults with College Degree −0.0013 −0.94
Number of Observations 27,666
Log Likelihood −8,094.17
Notes: Z Scores reflect cluster-corrections of standard errors by county.
Coefficients on indicator variables for missing values are omitted.
Regression is weighted by Medicare population of county.
570 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Table XIII.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Dependent Variable: Percent of Medicare




CMS Payment 0.0093 9.20
CMS Payment ∗ Indicator for 1998–2001 0.0022 7.93





Variables Affecting Average Variable Costs
Average Medicare Part A Costs −0.0001 −0.29
Average Medicare Part B Costs −0.0012 −3.74
Number of General Practitioners −0.0003 −0.38
Number of Registered Nurses −0.00004 −0.77
Number of Hospitals 0.009 0.78
Median Rent 0.0008 1.07
Population Density −0.00003 −2.61
Percent Population in Urban Areas 0.0106 3.74
Measures of the Size of the Market
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries −0.0000009 −0.03
Percent Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries −0.042 −0.16
Variables Affecting Fixed Costs of Entry
Number of HMOs in County in 1980 0.152 1.83
Percent Workforce in Manufacturing −0.019 −2.81
Percent Workforce White Collar 0.0686 4.65
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries 0.000001 3.32
in All Adjacent Counties
Percent Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries 1.284 3.58
in All Adjacent Counties
Variables Affecting the Probability of Enrollment
Per Capita Income −0.00001 −0.68
Poverty Rate Among Elderly −9.42 −7.18
Percent of Adults with High School Diploma −0.0121 −0.96
Percent of Adults with College Degree −0.0494 −3.23
Number of Observations 15,369
R-squared 0.56
Notes: t-statistics reflect cluster-corrections of standard errors by county.
Coefficients on indicator variables for missing values are omitted.
Regression is weighted by Medicare population of county.
penetration as an outcome of interest use fewer years of data than the
models presented earlier in this paper because CMS has only released
county market penetration rates in M+C since 1997. We use the logit
transformation so the dependent variable is of the form ln( P1−P ) where
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P represents the proportion of Medicare eligibles enrolled in a M+C
HMO.31
Results of the market penetration regressions appear in Table XIII.
The coefficients on both CMS payment and CMS payment interacted
with BBA regime are positive and statistically significant at a 1% level,
confirming that, controlling for costs, a higher CMS payment is associ-
ated with greater market penetration by HMOs into Medicare. Based on
these results, HMO participation is quite elastic to CMS payment: the
elasticity is 3.93 before the BBA and 4.94 after the BBA.
The market penetration results in Table XIII are similar to the
ordered probit regression results in Table VI in that the number of
Medicare beneficiaries residing in all adjacent counties, the percent of
the county population living in an urban area, and a lower poverty rate
among the elderly are associated with both a larger number of HMOs
in M+C and a greater penetration rate by HMOs into Medicare.32
7. Conclusion
This paper estimates the CMS payments necessary to support the
participation of a given number of HMOs in Medicare managed care
per county market. Ordered probit estimates suggest that in order to
support one Medicare HMO in half of US counties in the year 2001,
CMS would have to pay $581 per average enrollee per month in the
marginal county. Analogously, to support one Medicare HMO in every
county in the US in the year 2001, CMS would need to pay $877 per
enrollee per month in the marginal county. In contrast, CMS payments
for 2001 averaged $498.82 and ranged from $475.00 to $833.55.
It has been found that when several M+C HMOs are active in a
county, competition among the HMOs generates additional services at
lower cost for enrollees; if CMS desires the participation of multiple
HMOs in county markets, our estimates suggest that even greater
payments are required. Conditional on two HMOs already participating
in M+C, roughly an extra $60 per enrollee per month is necessary to
support each additional HMO.
We also find that, in 2001, 81.75% of all counties in the contiguous
48 United States received less than the estimated amount necessary to
31. To avoid missing values after the logit transformation, penetration rates of zero
were recoded to 0.0001.
32. In market penetration regressions in which we control for county-fixed effects (not
shown in table form), the effect of payment on market penetration is weakened. This is not
surprising, because fixed effects remove important variation in payment across counties.
After the BBA took effect, payments in most counties increased only 2–3% per year, so
little variation in payments remains after controlling for county-fixed effects.
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support an HMO in this market. Compared to counties that received
more than the estimated threshold for HMO participation, the counties
receiving an insufficient payment are on average more rural and less
populated with citizens who are less wealthy and less educated. The
relative disadvantage of rural and unpopulated counties persists 3 years
after the BBA of 1997, designed to eliminate such disparities, took effect.
We find that a large incremental payment would be required to include
the final 10% of counties among those supporting an HMO in M+C.
While in the year 2001 only 18.25% of counties in the contiguous 48
United States received a CMS payment greater than what was necessary
to support a single HMO in the Medicare managed care market, these
counties were home to 66.8% of all Medicare beneficiaries.
The exits of HMOs in some counties, combined with the healthy
participation of HMOs and rich set of benefits offered in other counties,
suggests that when setting prices for this program, the Federal gov-
ernment underestimated the costs of HMOs in many counties while
overestimating their costs in others. The root problem with the fiat
method of setting payments is a lack of information; even with the
growth of information technology, the Federal government does not
have the resources to track changes in costs in every local health care
market in the US in order to accurately set payments in this program.
Moreover, it is difficult to predict how the costs of M+C enrollees
may differ from those for the overall Medicare population. The lack of
information about future changes in costs in local health care markets is
also the reason that this paper does not predict how much needs to be
paid next year to achieve the participation of various numbers of HMOs.
In 2003, Congress acknowledged that the fiat system of payment
was flawed when it passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act. This law requires that CMS implement
in 2006 a system of competitive bids to set payments in this program;
providers will bid for the right to enroll Medicare beneficiaries. If the
process is properly structured, the bids will reveal the information CMS
currently lacks: providers’ private information about the costs of health
care delivery in local areas.
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